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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE 0'F UTAH

~IICHAEL

V. MALONEY,
Plaintiff and Appellamt,
Case No.

-vs.-

7926

SALT LAKE CITY, a corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

Appellant's Brief
This is an action to recover damages for personal
injuries suffered when a section of the city sidewalk
collapsed, causing the Appellant to fall. The case was
tried to a jury. The verdict was in favor of the plaintiff.
However, the court nullified the verdict by granting the
defendant's motion for a directed verdict, and the
plaintiff appeals.
1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The accident in question happened at approximately
105 East South Temple Street, in front of the Eagle
Gate Apartments. This is on the north side of South
Temple just a short distance east of the intersection of
South Temple and State Street. At this point the rity
maintains a sidewalk which runs east and west. Parallel
to the city walk and adjoining it on the north the Eagle
Gate Apartments maintain a strip of concrete. A section
of the city sidewalk was fissured and cracked and had
subsided, leaving a difference in elevation between the
city sidewalk and the private walk, with the private
walk being the higher of the two.
There is no dispute concerning the fact that the city
sidewalk was fissured, cracked and weakened at the
point in question, (Ex. A, B and C). There is also no
dispute concerning the fact that there was a large eaYity
under the sidewalk at this point. The cavity was approximately three feet across and fourteen inches deep,
(R. 97, 98 and Ex. No. 4). Appellant sustained injuries
when this section of the city's sidewalk collapsed under
his right foot, causing him to fall heavily on the pan•ment while his foot was still caught in the hole, (H. 40).
The extent of his injuries is not an issue on appeal.
Before the matter went to the jury, the eity madt•
a motion for a directed verdict which t lw court took
under advisement. The matter was then submitted to
the jury. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff
for $1,000.00 special damages, but awardt>d no g-t>w•ral
2
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damages. Thereafter, the court granted the motion for
a directed Yerdict. In Yiew of the fact that the main
issue on appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the ,·erdict, we will forego a detailed discussion of
the evidence here and discuss the evidence in connection
with the argument.
SPECIFICATIO~S

OF ERROR

1. The court erred in directing a verdict for the
defendant in (a) that there was sufficient evidence that
a dangerous defect existed in Respondent's sidewalk to
submit the issue of negligence to the jury; (b) there was
sufficient eYidence that the defect had existed for a long
enough period of time to constitute notice to the city of
the defect; and (c) there was sufficient evidence to show
that the defect of which the city had notice was the
proximate cause of the injury.

2. The court erred in refusing to grant a new trial
in view of the jury's failure to make an award of any
general damages.

ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I. THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT
TO SUSTAIN THE JURY'S VERDICT.
(a) The jury could reasonably have believed that
Respondent's walk had subsided and that the
subsidence had resulted in a substantial difference
in elevation between the city walk and the private
walk adjoining on the north.

3
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In view of the favorable verdict and the court's
granting of a directed verdict, plaintiff is entitled to
the most favorable view of the evidence. Therefore,
where there was a conflict, only that evidence favorable
to plaintiff will be noted. There is evidence that the
walk in the area of the collapse had been in general
disrepair for many years before November 21, 1!132, the
date of the accident. Mr. Smith, Respondent's witness,
testified there were "quite a number of cracks apparent
in the concrete", and they had "been there for years",
(R. 61). Mr. Turner, Respondent's witness, testified that
there had been no essential change in the condition of
the walk for six years, (R. 67). He testified particularly
about a "wide crack", apparent before the collapse, (R.
66). Mr. Jongejan remembered cracks before the accident which had been there "ever so long", (R. 70). Appellant's Exhibits A, B and C are pictures of the general
area and the hole into which appellant's foot dropped.
They show a number of cracks around the hole of the
kind Respondent's witnesses remember as having exi~tPd
for many years before the accident. Appellant testified
that the pictures fairly represented the condition, (R. 22).
The jury could (and since it decided for plaintiff, we
must assume it did) conclude that, except for tlH: cavity,
Exhibits A, B and C reflected the condition of the walk
before the accident.
Mr. Novak, an engineer, stated definitPly that tlw
cracks now observable in the city walk and shown ou
the pictures (Ex. A, Band C) are at least four yparH old.
He also testified that there was a general slope or decli4
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nation of the surface areas toward and under a patch
which was placed after the accident in repairing the
hole, (H . .J2-55). It is obvious from Exhibits A, B and ( ~
that when the cracks occurred they permitted or caused
a general sloping of Respondent's walk on all sides
toward the point of eventual collapse. 'rhe jury had an
opportunity to form first-hand impressions about the
slope of the walk approaching the patch through visiting
the scene.
Appellant testified that on the Monday after the
accident, there were differences in elevation between
Respondent's walk and the private walk, varying from
a half inch on one end of the hole to an inch on the other
end, (R. 24, 25). Plaintiff is corroborated by Exhibits
A, B and C, which definitely show the slab to the north
to be higher. Even Exhibit 2, taken at such an angle as
to minimize it, shows the difference. The differences
were presumably even greater at the point of maximum
depression within the section which collapsed, because
Novak, the engineer, testified that the general slope of
the area around the hole declined toward the hole, (R.
52-55).
The jury could have found that the difference in
elevation testified to by Appellant existed before the
accident. First, the pictures taken by Respondent were
taken only minutes after the accident, (R. 75). They
show from slightly different angles the exact thing shown
by Appellant's pictures. In all the pictures a difference
in elevation can be seen. The crack appears old and
5
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there is nothing to indicate a recent change in elevation.
At the trial counsel for the city showed the pictures to
the jury and unsuccessfully argued that the pictures
taken by the city and those offered by the Appellant
showed that a decided change took place between the
time the city's pictures and the Appellant's pictures
were taken. We ask the court to carefully examine the
pictures. We submit that they are photographs of an
identical condition. The light down into the hole gives
prominence to different things, but any close examination
will reveal that no change took place after the e~ty's
pictures were taken. The difference in elevation clearly
appears in Exhibits A and 2.
Secondly, all of the evidence given was to the effect
that the cracks were old. Novak said that they were at
least four years old, (R. 52-55). Mr. Turner said there
had been no essential change in the walk for six years,
(R. 67). Mr. Smith said there were a lot of cracks that
had been there for years, (R. 61). Mr. Jongejan remembered cracks that had been there "ever so long",
(R. 70). Also, attention has already been called to
Mr. Turner's testimony that before the accident tlwn•
was a wide crack in the pavement about ''a half inch
wide or so", (R. 66). He was Respondent's witness and
he so testified on direct examination. There are only
two cracks he could have been talking about, the rrark
marked X-X on Exhibit B, or the one marked Y- Y on
Exhibit C. He testified that the "half-inrh" erack was
between two cement blocks (which crack X-X is not)
and that it was not the crack (X-X) running from the
6
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step8 of the apartment house out toward the street. lle
must, therefore, have been referring to a half-inch crack
between Respondent's walk and the private walk, (crack
Y-Y). This, of course, is the crack referred to by Appellant as causing the difference in elevation. In this
regard it might also be noted that while the city sought
to meet this evidence by witnesses who had not noticetl
any difference in elevation (see Turner's testimony),
no u.:itness testified that the difference in elevation noted
by Appellant (R. 24-25) 1cas a recent condition arising
only after the accident.
Third, Novak testified concerning the appearance of
old cracks and how they differed in appearance from
new cracks. The jury, thus informed, saw the crack in
question as it sloped downward, (R. 100) into the cement
patch. The jury also saw the pictures.
There is thus evidence from which a jury could have
found that Respondent's walk had subsided many years
before the accident, resulting in a substantial difference
in elevation along about two feet of the joinder line between the city and the private walk. There is credible
evidence that the difference was as much as an inch on
one end of the hole and one-half inch on the other, (R. 2423). The difference occurred because of a breaking and
subsidence of the city walk, (R. 52), and not because of
a defect or elevation of the private walk.
There are many Utah cases holding that it is a question for the jury whether a particular defect in.. a street
or sidewalk is reasonably safe or dangerous for travel.

7
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They are cited and the rule is stated in Ray ·c. Salt Lake
City, 92 Utah 412, 119 A.L.R. 153. Among them an'
Jones v. Ogden City, 32 Utah 221; Bills r. Salt Lake Ci(t!,
37 Utah 507; Robinson v. Salt Lake Oity, 40 Utah -!91.
and Sweet v. Salt Lake City, 43 Utah 306. In Ray r. Salt
Lake City, Julia A. Ray tripped over a raised portion
of sidewalk located opposite No. 115 on Kelsey Avenue.
The difference in elevation between the cement sections
there under consideration varied from 1;4 to ~Is inches.
This court said :
"We can not say that the specified difference in
elevation is so slight that a careful or prudent
person might not reasonably anticipate danger
from its existence", and "we think a particular
defect in a street or sidewalk is reasonably safe
or dangerous for travel depends not always upon
the matter of difference of elevation or depression, but upon all the surrounding circumstances.''
What are the surrounding circumstances which may
be important in determining whether or not a defect is
dangerous? In Johnson v. City of Ilwaco, 229 P. (2d)
878, the Washington court, citing Ray v. Salt Lake C'ity,
supra, and concerning itself with this question said:
''The exact extent of the offset is not the only
factor to be considered. The nature and charadt>r
of the sidewalk, its location, the amount of tran•l
over it by pedestrians, the extent to whirh its
presence would ordinarily be seen or obsen·t•d hy
travelers on the sidewalk, and many other ronditions which might exist, all have to be tnkeu
into consideration.''

8
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In the case at bar, the defect was located, acconling to
the stipulation of the parties, (R. 99), near the intersection of two of Salt Lake City's busiest streets. It \Yas
immediately in front of a large apartment house, (Ex. 1).
There ·was thus constant pedestrian traffic over the
defeetiYe area.
Looking at the eYidence in the light most favorable
to the ...1\.ppellant, therefore, it is evident that the negligence question is much more definitely for the jury in
the instant case than it was in the Ray case. There is
evidence here that the offset was greater than that in
the Ray case-:Y2 " to 1" here as compared to 14 inch to
'Vs inch there. The defect was on busy South Temple
Street near State Street, as compared with Kelsey
Avenue. It was directly in front of a large apartment.
The jury reasonably decided that the defect was dangerous, and that, in the exercise of ordinary care the Respondent should have repaired it. On the question of
the existence of a dangerous defect there was evidence
sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. We next turn
to the question of notice.
(b) The existence of the defect for a number of years
at a location on one of Respondent's busy thoroughfares constituted notice to Respondent of the
defect and its dangerous character.
One of the main issues presented to the court below
was the issue of notice to the city of the defect. The city
took the position that it had to have notice that there
was a cavity under the sidewalk, and that if it did not
9
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have such notice, it was not guilty of negligence. The
Appellant took the position, and still does, that it was
not necessary to his recovery that the city have either
actual or constructive notice of the cavity. The crux of
the Appellant's case in this regard involves the fact that
the sidewalk was fissured, cracked and weakened at the
point where the collapse occurred. There was, as is
pointed out above, adequate evidence to support the
jury's verdict to the effect that there was a diffen'nce
in elevation of up to one inch on one of the cracks aiHl
that such a difference in elevation on one of the city's
busiest streets created a dangerous condition. There i~
also adequate evidence, as is pointed out above, that
this dangerous condition had existed for more than four
years, which under the cases eited below is sufficient iu
point of time to give the city constructive notice of the
existence of the crack. We are not contending that one
can impute notice of one defect from the existence of a
separate and independent defect. That is not the issue
involved here. The defect of which the city had notice
through the passing of time was a crack in the city
sidewalk.
The crack in question created a dangerous situation.
The danger from a broken walk is not confined to tripping. A person may also turn his ankle and fall. HP may
lose his balance because the broken part tilts. He might
also have, as happened here, a collapsing of tlw hrokt>Il
section. Thus the same identical craek which presented
a patent, visible danger, also caused the sidewalk to be
weakened and contributed directly to its collapse. It i~.

10
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I

'

therefore, not a problem of attempting to impute notice
of one defect from the existence of another. The defect
here which caused the accident was a substantial crack
in the sidewalk. This crack existed for over four years
and the city, in the exercise of ordinary care, should have
known of its existence.
The cases are clear that a jury can properly find
that a city has notice of a defect if it exists on a main,
heavily travelled street for a substantial period of time.
In this regard, it is not necessary to go to cases from
other jurisdictions. The problem has been presented to
the Utah Supreme Court in many cases. In a recent
Utah case, Pollari v. Salt Lake City, 111 Utah 25, 176 P.
( 2d) 111, this court said :
"The question of whether the city exercised
proper vigilence to discover defects depends on
the element of time, the nature and extent of the
defect, its prominence in location and other
factors bearing on what could reasonably be expected of a reasonably acting person charged with
the duty of supervising miles of streets and sidewalks. We think under the facts and circumstances of this case the question of constructive
notice was a question for the jury.''
In that case the defect had existed for approximately two years in a residential district of the city and
was a small hole, "at most five inches by three inches by
one and one-half inches deep", located on the edge of
the main walk. In the instant case the defect had existed,
as the jury could reasonably have found, for twice as
11
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long, was at least equally noticeable, and was located
in an area of heavier pedestrian traffic.
The problem of notice was also presented to thi"
court in Scoville v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah 60, 39 P. 481,
wherein the court said:
''The question of notice to Appellant ·was one of
fact for the jury to determine, and not a question
for the court (citing authorities). In Wisconsin
where a defect in a sidewalk existed one day, awl
in .Massachusetts, where a defect in a highway
existed 13 hours, and in Connecticut a few hours
from frozen water, it was held that it was for t1H.•
jury to determine whether that constituted sufficient notice (citing cases). This defect and accumulation of ice was on the most travelled walk
in the city. The question of notice is not alone
determined from the length of time a defect has
existed, but was from the nature and character of
the defect, the extent of the travel, nd whether
it is in a populous or sparsely settled part of the
city."
See also Jones v. Ogden City, 32 Utah 221, 89 P.
1006, wherein the court quoted from the S('orille raRP
with approval and held that a defect whith had l:xi~tt·d
for three days had existed long enough to permit tlw
case to go to the jury on the issue of notice.
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that there
is evidence from which the jury could ha \'l', and presumably did, find that the walk was generally fissun·d awl
cracked, and that these cracks had existed for more than
four years. The jury also could have, and presumably
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

did, find that the crack which presented this difference
in elevation also was one of the main cracks which caused
the weakening of the sidewalk permitting a collapse. It
is respectfully submitted that the general fissuring,
cracking and subsidence which resulted in a difference
in eleYation of up to one inch and also caused a weakening of the sidewalk would support the jury's verdict as
to the existence of a defect. The evidence that the defect
had existed on a busy street for over four years would
support the jury's verdict as to the issue of notice. Permitting a defect of this kind to exist four years or more
is, under the cases, sufficient to support a jury verdict
on the issue of negligence. The next issue relates to
proximate causation.

POINT NO. II. IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO THE
DOCTRINE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE THAT
RESPONDENT'S NEGLIGENCE BE THE SOLE
CAUSE, OR THAT APPELLANT'S INJURY
OCCUR IN A MANNER WHICH MIGHT HAVE
BEEN FORESEEN OR ANTICIPATED.

I
I

I

j,

r·

The record does not reflect the trial judge's reasons
for directing a verdict. We believe, however, that he did
so because the cavity was one of the causes of the sidewalk collapse, and there was little to indicate on the
surface that the cavity existed. We confess that the
cavity was one of the causes. We also confess that were
the cavity the sole cause, we could only recover by showing that the city knew or should have known that the
cavity existed. Here, however, the cavity was only one

13
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of t'wo ca·uses-the other being the cracking and fissuring
of the cement.
The city had notice of the dangerous crack. Its
greatest danger was that it might cause people to trip
and fall. But it was not necessary that a crack cause the
injury only by tripping. The sidewalk failed along this
very crack. The city would no\Y escape liability, because
the crack caused a fall through a collapse of the sidrwalk, instead of by tripping tl1e Appellant. The nrgligence of the city is in permitting this crack to go lmrrpaired for four years. This unrepaired crack was mw
of the main and direct causes of the sidewalk failure.
The cavity was not the sole cause. By itself it would
never have caused the injury. Cement in proper repair
will support the weight of a man walking normally down
the street. So long as the cement remains firm and unbroken, it will not collapse even though there is a fourteen inch cavity under it. It is thus fundamentally wrong
to say that the cavity was the only cause of the collapSL'.
It was the fissuring and cracking which weakened the
cement so that it would not support the weight of a
pedestrian. Apparently the cavity itself was old. The
cement had supported the traffic "·ithout breaking. The
immediate cause of the collapse "·as the cracking of thr
cement.
The law has always been that the negligence of the
defendant need be only one of the con<'urring or <'Olltributing causes. It is not necessary for us to show thnt
the cracking and fissuring of the sidewalk was the sole
14
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cause of the injury. In the Yery recent Utah case, Charcoz v. Bonnerille Irrigation District, 235 P. (2d) 780,
the trial court instructed the jury that if an act of God
be the primary cause of damage, there could be no recovery, irrespectiYe of negligence that may have coneurred with it in producing damage. The court held that
this instruction was erroneous, that it is well settled
that one is aecountable if his negligence concurs with an
act of God or with the negligence of a stranger in effecting damage. Here the cavity which was caused by
persons or reasons unknown concurred with the fissuring,
cracking and weakening of the sidewalk in causing the
plaintiff to fall. This proposition that the negligence of
the defendant need not be the sole cause is uniformly
recognized by the cases. See, for a general text statement, 38 Am. Jur. 715, Negligence, Section 63.

r

The conclusion is thus unescapable. The city was
negligent, because it permitted the cracked sidewalk to
go unrepaired on one of the city's busiest streets for
over four years. This unrepaired crack weakened the
cement so that it would not support the weight of the
appellant. This weakening, (added to the cavity) caused
the walk to collapse. It was certainly one of the direct,
contributing causes of the injury. Therefore, negligence
and proximate cause were shown, and the verdict of the
jury should have been sustained.
The cases, we believe, fully sustain our position that
it is not necessary that the city be able to foresee the
exact manner in which this dangerous, long-existing
15
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crack would cause injury. It is only necessary that the
city be able to foresee that this crack would in some
manner cause injury. Respondent can cite many cases
to the effect that a collapse in a walk where nothing
about the surface of the walk suggests the possibility
of injury is not actionable. None of the cases cited in
the court below by Respondent or found by us in research
is a case where there did exist on the surface at the
point of collapse a visible defect which was dangerouR
and which also contributed to the collapse. It is Appellant's position that, once Respondent's negligence has
been established, Respondent is liable for all injuries
directly attributable to its negligence whether or not the
manner of injury was to any extent foreseeable.
A very distinct variance in the approach to legal
cause is evident in the cases and among the writers.
Some say foreseeability of harm should be considered
only in determining whether the defendant was negligent
with reference to the plaintiff. Others say liability should
be limited, even where negligence is proven, to those
consequences which are to some degree foreseeabh•. A
landmark case illustrating the first approarh is In ](,.
Polemis and Furness & Co., (1921 (1.A.) 3 KB 560, 90
LJKB 1353. It there appeared that charterers of a ship
were carrying, among other things, a quantity of petrol.
There had been some leakage so that there were fumes
in the ship's hold. In removing the petrol a plank was
negligently knocked into the hold, and a resultant Rpark
destroyed the ship. It was found that sparking could not
reasonably have been anticipated under the rircum-

16
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stances, although some damage could have been. In
affirming an award, the court said:
'• \Yhat a defendant ought to have anticipated as
a reasonable man is material when the question
was whether or not he was guilty of want of due
care under the circumstances. . . . Given the
breach of duty which constitutes the negligence
and given the damage as a direct result of that
negligence, the anticipations of the person whose
negligent act has produced the damage appear
to me irrelevant.''
.Jiany English and American cases state the Polem·is
view, and it is supported by a formidable group of text
writers. 1 Enough heat has been generated about the
problem so that arguments are frequently stated. Professor F. H. Bohlen, 40 Am. L. Reg. (N.S.) 80, says:
"It may be hard to mulct the wrongdoer in
damages for results which the normal man would
not anticipate, but it is more unjust that the
person injured by the breach of duty imposed for
his protection should not recover for all the loss
which has, in the ordinary course of nature, been
caused him by the wrong because the wrongdoer
could not foresee the full effect of his act.''
Jeremiah Smith thoroughly considered the problem
and pointed up the injustice of making foreseeability an
element of legal cause in three Harvard Law Review
articles (Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 H.L.R. 103,
223, 303). Among his statements are:

1

Street Foundations of Legal Liability 116; 1 Bevan on Negligence
(Third Edition) 88-90; Jeremiah Smith, as quoted; F. H. Bohlen,
as quoted.
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"In the first place, it is not the law that, to
constitute an action negligent the connection must
be such that a particular injury could have been
foreseen. If injury in some form would be the
natural sequence of the negligence, the party
guilty of the negligence is warned of the danger
of his course, and that is all the warning to whieh
he is entitled under the law.'' Ill. Central v.
Creighton, 63 Ill. App. 165.
''The test is whether eonditions which lead to an
extraordinary or even unprecedented accident
were such that no reasonably prudent proprietor
would have suffered to exist. The particular
manifestations of the result of careless conditions
is not infrequently quite out of the usual experience, but if the conditions possess elements of
negligence, the person responsible for them may
also be held responsible for the result.'' Dulligan
v. Barber Asphalt Paving Company, 87 N.E. 567.
Most jurisdictions in the United States have adoptL•d
one view or the other with reference to the legal cnu:-;P
controversy. The Utah court made its position very
clear in the case of Stone v. Railroad, 32 Utah 185, 89 P.
715. In that case the Union Pacific Railroad had operated
a freight engine from which steam was escaping in s1wh
quantities as to obscure the vision of the engineer.
Because of the steam and the fact that the enginN•r wns
mis-informed that a passenger train travelling in tlw
opposite direction would be an hour and 50 miuutt•:-; la t L'l,
a collision occurred. The court admitted that tlw jury
could have found that an injury of the kind whieh ditl
occur (collision with another train) was a foreseeable
consequence of the defendant's Ht•nding a tlef'Petive
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but it did not place its decision on that ground.
\Yhether or not collision with another train could have
been anicipated, injury of some kind was foreseeable if
such an engine (leaking steam) were allowed to operate.
The court said at page 205 :

l'HgiHL',

"If the act is one which the party in the exercise
of ordinary care could have anticipated as likely
to result in injury, then he is liable for any injury
actually resulting from it, although he could not
have anticipated the particular injury whieh did
occur.''
This statement, so definitely an adoption of the view of
Bohlen, Smith, etc., has been repeated by the Utah court
in lVilcox v. TVunderlich, 272 P. 215; Hess v. Robinson,
163 P. (2d) 510, and Fttrkovich v. Bingha,m Coal and
Lumber, 143 P. 121.

r

It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the jury
could have and did find that the city permitted a crack
to exist for four years or more; that the crack presented
a difference in elevation of up to one inch; that such a
difference in elevation was dangerous to pedestrians ;
that this same identical crack caused the sidewalk to be
weak and incapable of supporting the weight of a pedestrian; that because of this crack the sidewalk collapsed,
causing the plaintiff to suffer injuries. It clearly is not
important that there was another contributing cause (the
cavity) which the city could not see from the surface.
It is not necessary in tort law that the city's negligence
be the sole cause. Here the unrepaired crack was one
of the direct and proximate causes. The Ray v. Salt Lake
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City case squarely held that a difference in elevation less
than that involved here on a street less heavily travelled,
created a condition which the jury could properly find
was dangerous and negligent. In the Pollari case and
the other cases cited above, this court held that defects
existing from three days to two years have existed for
a sufficient length of time to permit a jury to find that
the city was negligent in not discovering them.
It is clear also from the cases that it is not necessary
that the unrepaired crack should cause injury only by
tripping. This crack caused the sidewalk to become
weakened and to collapse. Negligence and proximate
causation were proved and the jury resolved the issues
on negligence, notice and causation in plaintiff's favor.
The verdict should have been allowed to stand.

POINT NO. III. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE
JURY IMPROPERLY RENDERED ITS VERDICT AWARDING SPECIAL DAMAGES WITHOUT ANY AWARD FOR GENERAL DAMAGgs.
A verdict was returned by the jury in the amount
of $1,000.00 designated special damages. ~rhP evidence
clearly sustains an award of special damages in the
amount of $1,000.00. Appellant's loss of earnings alone
amounted to $1050.00. No award for general damages
was made. The uncontradicted evidence shows that
Appellant suffered painful injuries, was confined to hi~
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bed for a period of time and thereafter had continuing
pain and inconvenience. He is entitled to an award of
some general damages. Appellant, therefore, requests
the court to reverse the order directing a verdict against
plaintiff; to enter an order re-establishing the award of
special damages in the amount of $1,000.00 and permitting a new trial on the question of general damages.
Respectfully submitted,

EDWARD W. CLYDE
FRANK J. ALLEN
Attorneys for Appellant
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